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THE EXPECTANCY OF PAROLE IN MONTANA: A
RIGHT ENTITLED TO SOME DUE PROCESS
Linda M. Trueb
I. INTRODUCTION
Until 1979, the common law uniformly stated that parole was
a matter of grace.' Courts held that a validly convicted person had
no right to an early release.2 States therefore had no duty to create
a parole system for prisoners. If a state did create a parole system,
the prisoner's expectancy of parole was only a mere hope of an
early conditional release.4
Since 1979, courts have agreed that a parole statute may cre-
ate a right to parole. Courts disagree, however, over what will raise
the expectancy of parole from the status of a mere hope to that of
a right.' This comment examines the statutory language necessary
to create an entitlement to parole and the status of parole in Mon-
tana. It examines the minimum procedural due process accorded
the parole-release decision process when parole has the status of a
right. Finally, it compares the due process currently accorded pa-
role decisions in Montana to the minimum due process guidelines
established by the United States Supreme Court.
II. GREENHOLTZ AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO EXPECT
PAROLE
In 1979, the landmark case of Greenholtz v. Inmates of Ne-
braska Penal and Correctional Complex held that a parole statute
gives prisoners a right to expect their parole if the statutory lan-
guage creates a presumption of release.6 The United States Su-
preme Court held that a Nebraska statute which mandated parole
created such a presumption of release, absent negative enumerated
1. E.g., State ex rel. Herman v. Powell, 139 Mont. 583, 589, 367 P.2d 553, 556 (1961);
State v. Farmer, 39 Wash. 2d 675, 679, 237 P.2d 734, 736 (1951).
2. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976) (which states that a valid convic-
tion extinguishes all right to release prior to termination of the sentence).
3. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7
(1979).
4. E.g., Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 282 (5th Cir. 1973) (which
notes the difference between the possibility of parole and the present right to parole).
5. Compare, e.g., Allen v. Board of Pardons, 792 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir.), cert. granted,
107 S. Ct. 431 (1986) (holding that some mandatory statutory language is necessary) with
Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1093 (1981) (hold-
ing that the creation of a parole system, regardless of the wording, is all that is required to
create a right).
6. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12.
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conditions.' The Nebraska parole statute gave prisoners a right to
expect parole, which is entitled to some constitutional due process
protection."
The Greenholtz court ruled that a prisoner's right to expect
parole arises from statutory language which binds, by its
mandatory language, a parole board to release an inmate.9 The Ne-
braska statute stated:
Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a commit-
ted offender who is eligible for release on parole, it shall order his
release unless it is of the opinion that his release should be de-
ferred because:
(a) There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the
conditions of parole;
(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime
or promote disrespect for law;
(c) His release would have a substantially adverse effect on
institutional discipline; or
(d) His continued correctional treatment . . . will substan-
tially enhance his capacity to lead a law-abiding life when re-
leased at a later date.'"
The legislature's use of a mandatory shall, absent the specified
negative factors, creates an entitlement to parole deserving of some
due process." The Greenholtz court, however, warned that future
litigation over the status of parole in other states should be de-
cided only after looking at all the facts of the case.' 2 This vague
warning to look at all the facts has led to divergent rulings on what
is necessary to create such a right. ,
A. Parole in Other States
Courts supporting a narrow interpretation of Greenholtz have
ruled that a statute creates a right to expect parole only if it uses
7. Id.
8. Id. The fifth and fourteenth amendments require that a person with a right to lib-
erty, regardless of the importance of the particular liberty, be given some measure of due
process before being deprived of the right. U.S. CONST. amend. 5, 14. A right by its nature,
not its weight, is entitled to due process. See, e.g., Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224; Walker v.
Hughes, 558 F.2d 1247, 1251 (6th Cir. 1977).
9. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-12. Other cases subsequent to Greenholtz have stated
that a right to parole arises from a limitation of parole board discretion. Hewitt v. Helms,
459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983); Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 466 (1981).
State law may limit official discretion by mandating the procedure, evidence or criteria to be
applied. Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 466.
10. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1, 114(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
11. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7.
12. Id. at 12.
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identical "shall release. . . unless" language.' 3 Any other statutory
language gives inmates only a mere hope of parole,14 and a mere
hope of parole does not warrant any due process protection.15 This
narrow interpretation disregards the warning to consider all the
facts, instead giving weight only to statutory language identical to
that in Greenholtz. Many jurisdictions thus have rejected this nar-
row interpretation. 6
The broadest interpretation of Greenholtz holds that the exis-
tence of a parole system, regardless of the particular language
used, gives prisoners a right to expect parole. 17 The administrative
rules and parole board policies provide a sufficient limitation on
official discretion.' 8 Adhering to this broad opinion, a Delaware
court in Winsett v. McGinnes held that even expressed goals, be-
hind a work release program, limited official discretion enough to
create a right.' 9 No court, however, has applied this decision to pa-
role-release cases. The Winsett case continues to be the only deci-
sion to apply a broad interpretation of Greenholtz.20
The majority of courts interpret Greenholtz as supporting the
recognition of a right to expect parole when a parole statute uses
some type of mandatory language.2 ' These courts hold that a stat-
ute containing any mandatory language and specific criteria limits
discretion enough to raise the expectancy of parole to the status of
a right.2 2 For example, in Williams v. Missouri Board of Probation
& Parole,28 the court held that the Missouri parole statute, which
13. See Campbell v. Montana State Bd. of Pardons 470 F. Supp. 1301 (D. Mont.
1979); Candelaria v. Griffin, 641 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1981).
14. See, e.g., Campbell, 470 F. Supp. at 1302.
15. Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 408-09 (2d Cir. 1970).
16. See generally Allen, 792 F.2d 1404; Bauman v. Arizona Dep't of Corrections, 754
F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1985); Mayes v. Trammel, 751 F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1984); Peck v. Battery,
721 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1983); Scott v. Illinois Parole & Pardon Bd., 669 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir.
1982); Williams v. Briscoe, 641 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1981); Williams v. Missouri Bd. of Proba-
tion & Parole, 661 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1981); Bowles v. Tennant, 613 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1980);
Booth v. Hammock, 605 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1979); Wagner v. Gilligan, 609 F.2d 886 (6th Cir.
1979); Shirley v. Chestnut, 603 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1979). All these cases require some
mandatory language as a prerequisite to creation of a right to expect parole, but none limit
the mandatory language necessary to only a "shall/unless" statutory wording.
17. This broad holding was first suggested by a dissenting opinion in Greenholtz. See
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 22 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
18. Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F.2d 996, 1006 (3d Cir. 1980).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See cases cited, supra note 16.
22. Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 446; See also Roberts v. Spalding, 783 F.2d 867, 870 (9th
Cir. 1986) (which holds that a state statute will not create a right to supplemental medical
care unless it gives particularized standards or criteria).
23. 661 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1981).
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contains the wording "when . . . shall release," limited official dis-
cretion and created an entitlement to parole.2 In Scott v. Illinois
Parole & Pardon Board,2 5 the court ruled that the Illinois statute
created an entitlement to parole. The Scott court held that the
language "when . . . shall not" created a presumption of parole
eligibility.26 This presumption limited parole board discretion
enough to raise the expectancy of parole from a mere hope to a
right.
The majority position is supported by the United States Su-
preme Court's general ruling that a limitation on official discretion,
sufficient to create a liberty entitled to due process, requires some
mandatory language. 28 The Court has held that mutually explicit
understandings do not limit discretion enough to raise a hope to
the status of a right.2 9 Additionally, the Court has ruled that sta-
tistical probabilities based on past board decisions are not suffi-
cient limitations on official discretion. Only a statute with some
form of mandatory language will raise a mere hope of a release to
the status of a right.3'
B. Parole in Montana
The status of parole in Montana has changed through altera-
tions in the parole statute language and, more recently, from
changes in the interpretation of that statute. Montana enacted its
first parole statute in 1907.32 The 1907 statute extended the possi-
bility of parole to all prisoners without prior convictions.3  The
permissive language of the statute gave the state board of pardons
and the governor broad discretion in parole-release decisions.34
24. Id. at 698-99.
25. 669 F.2d at 1190. See also Mayes, 751 F.2d at 178-79.
26. Scott, 669 F.2d at 1190.
27. Id.
28. Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 466.
29. See Jago v. Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 20 (1981) (which held that Ohio inmates had no
right to expect parole). The Court recognized that an entitlement to property, unlike an
entitlement to liberty, may be created by mutually explicit understandings. See, Perry v.
Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
30. See Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 465 (which held that a convicted felon in Connecticut
had no right to a commutation of a life sentence).
31. See McFarland v. Cassady, 779 F.2d 1426, 1428 (9th Cir. 1986) (which held that
mandatory language in an Arizona statute gave prisoners a right to expect good-time
credits).
32. MONT. REV. CODES § 9573 (1907).
33. Id.
34. This first parole statute, MONT. REV. CODES § 9573 (1907), stated that: "The Gov-
ernor may recommend and the State Board may parole any inmate. . . of the State Prison,
under such reasonable conditions and regulations as may be deemed expedient, and adopted
[Vol. 48
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The indeterminate sentencing law enacted in 1915 broadened
the discretion of the board."5 This law required judges to fix maxi-
mum and minimum terms for each sentence."6 The board and the
governor then fixed the exact sentence.3 7 Under this law, the board
would fix the minimum sentence and consider an inmate eligible
for parole if the inmate showed a disposition to reform.3 8 The sen-
tence range and possibility of parole was intended to provide an
incentive for rehabilitation.3 9 Rehabilitation could result in an
early parole. Early parole could benefit the community as well as
the individual. Rehabilitated prisoners could be paroled to "regain
their standing as useful citizens in the community.""0
In 1955, the legislature changed the parole language from
"may" to "shall." The new language mandated parole after a pris-
oner satisfied all eligibility requirements."1 This language has re-
mained unchanged, although eligibility requirements have been
amended several times since 1955. The present parole statute
states:
Subject to the following restrictions, the board shall release on
parole by appropriate order any person confined in the Montana
state prison or the women's correction center . . . when in its
opinion there is reasonable probability that the prisoner can be
released without detriment to the prisoner or to the community
42
The restrictions in the statute are a prerequisite to parole. These
restrictions allow the board to consider an inmate only after: (1)
they serve 30 years of a life sentence;43 or (2) they serve the lesser
of 17 1/2 years or 1/2 their sentence less good time-if designated a
. Id. (emphasis added).
35. MONT. REV. CODES § 12075 (1915). The indeterminate sentencing law was repealed
March 12, 1929.
36. MONT. REV. CODES § 12075 (1921), which stated:
[When] any person shall be found guilty of any crime or offense punishable
by imprisonment in the state prison, except treason, murder in the first degree,
rape by force, or administering poison to a human being with intent to kill, the
court must, instead of fixing the punishment at a definite term, provide in the
sentence and judgement that the defendant be confined . . . not less than a cer-
tain time nor longer than a certain time, both the minimum and maximum time
shall be named ..
Id.
37. MONT. REV. CODES § 12076 (1915).
38. In re Collins, 51 Mont. 215, 217, 152 P. 40, 41 (1915).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. MONT. REV. CODES § 94-9832 (1947).
42. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-201(1) (1985) (emphasis added).
43. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-201(1)(b) (1985).
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dangerous offender; or (3) they serve the lesser of 17 1/2 years or 1
of their sentence less good time-if designated a nondangerous
offender."
The language of the Montana parole statute differs from the
language of the Administrative Rules. The parole statute states the
board "shall" release an inmate who has met the requirements,
rules, and regulations regarding parole; the rules, however, state
that the board "may" issue a release. 5 Yet, until 1986, Montana
courts continued to interpret both the statute and rules as
permissive. 6
In 1986, this permissive interpretation was upset by the hold-
ing of Allen v. Board of Pardons.7 In Allen, the Ninth Circuit held
that the "shall release . . . when" language of the Montana parole
statute mandated parole.48 The Allen court held that this mandate
limited board discretion and gave prisoners a right to expect pa-
role, although the rules remain permissive.4 9 Allen is currently on
appeal to the United States Supreme Court."0
III. DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
A. The Nature of the Right Affects the Amount of Due
Process
The due process required will depend on surrounding factors
such as the nature of the right.5 Although the common law does
not require a "full panoply" of due process rights, it does require
enough to insure the fundamental fairness of the parole system.52
The injury incurred when a right is lost depends upon the na-
ture of the right. Courts have stated that the loss, by denial of
44. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-201(1)(a) (1985). There are two exceptions to these gen-
eral eligibility requirements: (1) An inmate will be ineligible for parole if a court includes an
ineligibility restriction as part of the sentence, MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-201(3) (1985); and
(2) An inmate may be eligible for parole 120 days earlier when for 30 consecutive days, (a)
the Montana State Prison population exceeds by 96 inmates the 744 maximum capacity, or
(b) the Women's Correctional Center exceeds its design capacity by 35 inmates, MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-23-201(3) (1985).
45. Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-201(1) (1985) with MONT. ADMIN. R.
20.25.401(3) (1980).
46. E.g., Powell, 139 Mont. 583, 367 P.2d 553; Campbell, 470 F. Supp. 1301; Goff v.
State, 139 Mont. 641, 367 P.2d 557 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 806 (1962).
47. 792 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1986).
48. Id. at 1406-07. Allen overruled Campbell. Id.
49. Id. at 1408.
50. The Allen case is currently on appeal to the United States Supreme Court: Docket
No. 86-461. 107 S. Ct. 431 (1986).
51. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 560.
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parole, of the expectancy of an early conditional release is less
grievous than the loss, by revocation of parole, of a right presently
being enjoyed.53 Parole-revocation terminates a release, while a de-
nial of parole delays a release.54 Because a denial of parole is a less
grievous loss, it has been accorded no greater procedural protec-
tions than those given in parole-revocation proceedings.
Greenholtz required that prisoners eligible for parole be given:
(1) notice; (2) the right to appear in person and present evidence
on their behalf; (3) the reason(s) for denial; and (4) general access
to the information used in a parole decision-subject to Board dis-
cretion.55 By comparison, Morrissey v. Brewer" required that pa-
rolees be given additional procedural protections including: (1) a
written notice; (2) a neutral and detached hearing body; (3) a dis-
closure in advance of the evidence against the parolee; (4) the right
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless good
cause exists to deny such a confrontation); and (5) a written state-
ment of the reasons for revoking parole, including a statement of
the evidence relied on."
B. The Decision-Maker and Method of Determining Due
Process
After courts determine that a parole statute gives prisoners
the right to expect parole, a second issue arises concerning who
determines how much due process shall be accorded this right. Al-
though courts agree that procedural due process protects individ-
ual rights against arbitrary government action, they disagree about
who may prescribe such procedures." Some courts have held that a
state may determine how much procedural process is due. 9 These
courts apply the "entitlement theory" which states that a right will
not be created unless the state defines both the substance and the
procedure. The state retains the right to determine according to its
53. E.g., Wolff, 418 U.S. at 560-61. This case holds that revocation of parole deprives a
person of a conditional liberty presently enjoyed while loss of good-time credits does not
work an immediate change in the conditions of a prisoner's liberty. Such a loss merely
postpones the date of eligibility for parole. Id.
54. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 9.
55. Id. at 14-16.
56. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
57. Id. at 489.
58. Compare, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) with Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 546 (1974).
59. See, e.g., Bishop, 426 U.S. 341; Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). This the-
ory is in effect similar to the "Rights versus Privileges" common law distinction that pre-
vailed prior to the late 1960s. If procedural due process is dependent on a state determina-
tion, then the state-created entitlement is in effect no more than a state privilege.
1987]
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discretion, the quantity and quality of due process."0
Opponents of the entitlement theory support the "impact the-
ory," which holds that a state may only create the substance of the
right.6' This theory is based upon the belief that government offi-
cials could arbitrarily deprive an individual of a right without any
accountability to the judiciary, if states are allowed to prescribe
the procedural safeguards attaching to a right.62 An inherent fair-
ness is assured by the judicial process which is not assured through
an administrative process.6 3 The majority of courts have thus as-
sumed that only the judiciary has the right to determine the
amount of due process accorded to prisoners who become eligible
for parole consideration."'
Judicial determination of due process requires a balancing of
various factors. Courts must balance these factors: (1) the nature
and burden on the individual liberty at issue; (2) the risk of erro-
neous deprivation of such an interest by the procedures used; (3)
the probable value of additional or substitute procedural safe-
guards; and (4) the burden on the government from such addi-
tional safeguards.6 Since Greenholtz, all judicial parole-release de-
cisions have used this balancing approach to determine the due
process required.6
C. The Risk of Error, the Value of Additional Due Process,
and the Cost to the State
The risk of error is another factor in determining the amount
of due process required. 7 The amount of due process required will
depend upon the degree of risk of error. Justice Marshall, in a dis-
senting opinion in Greenholtz, asserted that the risk of an errone-
ous denial of parole is great because of the existence of inaccura-
60. See id. at 152.
61. E.g., Walker v. Hughes, 558 F.2d 1247, 1254-55 (6th Cir. 1977); Arnett, 416 U.S. at
167 (Powell, J., dissenting); Note, "Some Measure" of Protection: Due Process in the Bal-
ance in Greenholtz, 34 U. MIAMi L. REv. 357, 373 (1980).
62. Opponents of the "Entitlement Theory" argue that if an inmate's liberty interest
is no greater than the state chooses to allow, then the inmate is no more than a slave of the
state. E.g., Meachum v. Fano 427 U.S. 215, 233 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Morris-
sey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942, 952-53 (8th Cir. 1981) (Lay, J., dissenting), rev'd, 408 U.S. 471
(1972).
The idea that an inmate is a slave of the state is a 19th Century position. See, e.g.,
Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
63. See In re Meidinger, 168 Mont. 7, 15, 539 P.2d 1185, 1190 (1975).
64. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558.
65. E.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 (1972);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
66. See generally cases cited, supra note 16.
67. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 13.
[Vol. 48
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cies in many inmates' files. 68 Several cases support this assertion.
In Kohlman v. Norton,6 the board denied parole because an in-
mate's file erroneously stated that he used a gun in the robbery
committed. In In re Rodriguez°7 0 parole was denied because a file
incorrectly stated that the inmate had violent tendencies and his
family rejected him. Such file errors are certain in an overcrowded
and undermanned prison system. Prison officials do not have the
time to check the accuracy of letters and other information placed
in an inmate's file.
Justice Marshall argued that because of the risk of incorrect
information, additional safeguards should be required beyond
those set by the Greenholtz majority. 71 He argued that courts
should require that an inmate be given notice reasonably in ad-
vance of a parole hearing to allow an inmate time to arrange for
favorable witnesses and counsel.72 Additionally, Marshall argued
that a written summary of the evidence should be given so that an
inmate could challenge erroneous evidence.7" Such additional due
process requirements would greatly reduce the risk of a denial of
parole because of erroneous information in files.
Few courts have required additional due process procedures
because additional procedures place an additional burden on the
state. 4 Many legal scholars, however, debate whether the fiscal
and administrative burdens of a state should even be considered.
Some have asserted that financial costs should never determine
how much procedural protection to accord a fundamental right.75
Justice Powell's dissent in Greenholtz implied that the expectancy
of parole is a fundamental right that requires additional proce-
dural protections. He stated, "[L]iberty from bodily restraint al-
ways has been recognized as the core of the liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause. ' 76 Others argue that burdens to the state
68. Id. at 33 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Justices Brennan and Stevens joined in this
dissent).
69. 380 F. Supp. 1073 (D. Conn. 1974).
70. 14 Cal. 3d 639, 537 P.2d 384, 112 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1975). See also State v. Pohlabel,
61 N.J. Super. 242, 160 A.2d 647 (1960) (the inmate's file incorrectly stated that he was
under a life sentence in another jurisdiction).
71. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 32 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 38-39.
74. Missouri is one of the few states to hold that the conditional right to parole neces-
sitates appraising prisoners of adverse information that may lead to an unfavorable decision.
Missouri courts also require that prisoners be given a chance to rebut inaccurate file infor-
mation. Williams v. Missouri Bd. of Probation & Parole, 661 F.2d 697, 700 (8th Cir. 1981).
75. See generally, Huff, Protecting Due Process and Civic Friendship in the Adminis-
trative State, 42 MONT. L. REV. 1 (1981).
76. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 18 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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must be considered, because failing to consider costs could contrib-
ute to the elirination of state-created rights."
Courts should require additional due process if it would re-
duce the risk of a wrongful deprival of parole, yet minimally bur-
den the state. This judicial determination of what additional re-
quirements will adequately insure the fairness of parole
proceedings, at a minimal cost to the state, depends upon an anal-
ysis of the parole laws unique to each state.
IV. PAROLE PROCEDURES IN MONTANA
Parole procedures in Montana are largely controlled by ad-
ministrative rules for two reasons. First, Montana case law is
largely silent on the due process required in parole proceedings.
Prior to the Allen case, Montana courts considered the expectancy
of parole only a matter of grace, not a right. Parole determinations
therefore were not entitled to any due process or subject to judicial
review. 78 Secondly, the Montana parole statute states only that the
board of pardons shall interview an inmate prior to parole.79 The
parole statute permits an inmate to be represented by counsel;80 it
also allows any person to present oral statements to the board on
behalf of the prisoner."1
The Administrative Rules of Montana state the type of hear-
ing, notice, access to files, and notification of an adverse decision
which must be given to an inmate. These rules provide for two
types of hearings. An inmate will be given an initial informal inter-
view sometime within the two months prior to their eligibility for
parole.8 2 No statements may be made by counsel or any other per-
son prior to, or at, this personal interview.83 Inmates, however, are
77. Id. at 13. Cf., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34 § 1671-1679 (1964), repealed by Me. Acts,
ch. 499, § 71 (in 1975, Maine repealed its parole statute, thereby eliminating its entire pa-
role system).
Additionally, Missouri has changed its right to parole to a mere hope of parole by a
change in statutory wording. Following Williams, 661 F.2d 697 (which ruled that a Missouri
statute created an entitlement to parole, absent specified conditions, by its mandatory
wording), Missouri changed the mandatory wording in their parole statute to a permissive
wording. In Gale v. Moore, 763 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1985), the court held that the new parole
statute with its permissive wording no longer gave prisoners a right to expect parole. Com-
pare Mo. REV. STAT. § 217.690 (Supp. 1982) (the new Missouri statute making parole per-
missive) with Mo. REV. STAT. § 549.261 (1980) (the old statute which by its mandatory word-
ing gave prisoners a right to expect parole).
78. E.g., Herman, 139 Mont. at 589, 367 P.2d at 556.
79. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-202(2) (1985).
80. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-204 (1985).
81. Id.
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entitled to a hearing, where they may be represented by counsel,
friends, and family.8' Notice of this hearing must be given in the
month preceding the hearing." If the board denies parole, it must
give the inmate written notice of its decision and the general rea-
sons for the denial."
The provisions for prior notice, hearing, and notification of the
board's decision meet the minimum due process mandated by
Greenholtz.87 Although Montana meets the minimum due process
required in parole proceedings, it does not give its inmates the ad-
ditional protections Nebraska and Missouri accord to their in-
mates. Nebraska inmates are allowed access to the information and
documents in their files, subject to the discretion of the board.8
Missouri inmates are not given access to their files, but they have a
right to be advised of the adverse information in their files.89
Neither of these due process protections are afforded to Montana
prisoners. In Montana, files are closed.90
The issue of file access is controversial. Generally, the common
law holds that an inmate is not entitled to file access. 1 When file
access is denied, however, courts have sometimes required that in-
mates be given a summary of the evidence supporting an adverse
parole decision, and be given an opportunity to rebut it.2 Because
inmate files are closed in Montana, courts should require that in-
mates be given a summary of the evidence supporting an adverse
decision. A summary of the evidence would greatly reduce the risk
of file error. Yet, the cost in requiring a summary of evidence
would be minimal in comparison to the cost involved in indepen-
dently investigating and verifying all information put into files.
Some verification of file information is necessary to reduce the risk
of wrongful denials of parole. A summary of the evidence relied
upon, or access to files, would allow inmates to verify file informa-
tion. It would bring errors to the attention of inmates and give
them the opportunity to offer evidence refuting such errors.
84. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-204 (1985).
85. MONT. ADMIN. R. 20.25.101(4) (1980).
86. MONT. ADMIN. R. 20.25.502 (1980).
87. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 14-16.
88. NEa. REV. STAT. § 83-1, 112(1) (1976) (which allows the board to make file informa-
tion available to inmates if the board determines it will facilitate the parole hearing).
89. Williams v. Missouri Bd. of Probation & Parole, 661 F.2d 697, 700 (8th Cir. 1981).
90. MONT. ADMIN. R. 20.25.401(5) (1980).
91. E.g., Mayes v. Trammell, 751 F.2d 175, 179 (6th Cir. 1984).
92. Williams, 661 F.2d at 700.
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V. CONCLUSION
Allen changes Montana's restrictive interpretation of Green-
holtz, giving prisoners the right to expect parole. The court states
that the mandatory language in the Montana parole statute gives
prisoners a right to expect parole, upon fulfillment of enumerated
conditions. Furthermore, Allen assures inmates that they will be
entitled to some procedural protections before they are denied pa-
role.9 3 These procedural protections could increase inmate confi-
dence in the fairness of the system: a confidence many inmates
give up while trying to survive in a hostile, overcrowded prison.
Currently, inmates are denied both access to their files and a
summary of the evidence supporting a denial of parole. Current
procedure precludes inmate knowledge of any erroneous file infor-
mation that could result in denial of parole. Montana courts could
reduce the risk of wrongful denials of parole by giving inmates an
opportunity to rebut any erroneous information brought to their
attention by a brief summary of evidence. A summary would pre-
serve the confidentiality of sources, yet increase inmate confidence
in the system and encourage inmate reform. The encouragement of
reform was the original purpose of parole. The extent of rehabili-
tation possible in a harsh prison environment is debateable, yet
any inmate reform deserves encouragement. Fuller disclosure of
file information could be one small step towards assuring inmates
of the fairness of the parole system, and thereby encouraging their
reform.
93. See Allen v. Board of Pardons, 792 F.2d 1404, 1408 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S.
Ct. 431 (1986).
94. See generally, In re Collins, 51 Mont. 215, 152 P. 40 (1915). Anything that encour-
ages inmates to reform resulting in the parole of rehabilitated prisoners, would also prevent
the use of parole as a tool to reduce bulging prison populations. See generally MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-23-201(3) (1985) (which allows for an early eligibility for parole when the popula-
tion in the prison exceeds its designed capacity by a certain number).
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